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EDUCATION FUNDING IN MAINE IN LIGHT OF
ZELMAN AND LOCKE: TOO MUCH PLAY IN THE
JOINTS?
Sarah M Lavigne·
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the countervailing directives
of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause for decades. One area in
which this battle has been particularly contentious is the issue of public funding of
religious schools. On one hand, opponents argue that such funding is an impermissible
co-mingling of church and state, thereby violating the Establishment Clause.
Meanwhile, proponents of public funding ofreligious schools argue that, to withhold
funding from religious schools would place a burden on those wishing to send their
children to religious schools, thereby impermissibly preventing individuals from
practicing their faith and violating the Free Exercise Clause.
In two recent cases involving public funding of religious education, Locke v.
Davey1 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,2 the Court arrived at outcomes that seem at
first glance to be as difficult to reconcile as the Religion Clauses themselves; Locke
resulted in the lack of public funding for religious education, while in Zelman the
receipt of public funds by religious schools was declared constitutional. The Zelman
opinion, though, was primarily a pronouncement that states may fund religious schools
if they affirmatively choose to do so, while the Locke opinion articulated that a state
cannot be forced to fund religious education if it chooses not to do so. The Court,
unfortunately, did not clarify where the first principle left off and where the second
principle picked up.
In Zelman, a divided Court upheld a program in Ohio that allowed Cleveland
parents to remove their children from the public school system, send them to private
schools-both secular and religious-and have that private school tuition paid for in
part by vouchers distributed by the government. 3 Finding that the program did not
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court highlighted the fact that
the Cleveland public school system was, by all accounts, woefully under-serving the
students ofCleveland. 4 The Court also found important the fact that public funds were

*
I.
2.
3.
4.

J.D., 2007, University of Maine School of Law.
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 644. The Court observed that:
Only I in IO ninth graders could pass a basic proficiency examination, and students at all
levels performed at a dismal rate compared with students in other Ohio public schools.
More than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or failed out before graduation.
Of those students who managed to reach their senior year, one of every four still failed to
graduate. Of those students who did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at levels
comparable to their counterparts in other cities.

Id.
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not going directly to religious institutions, but rather were being diverted to parents,
who then were free to choose to pass those funds along to pay for tuition at religious
schools. 5
Two years later, in Locke, the Court upheld a Washington state postsecondary
scholarship program that expressly excluded from eligibility any student who was
pursuing a degree in devotional theology. 6 Even though, as in Zelman, the government
funding in Locke was diverted through an individual whose private choice would have
resulted in the funding ofreligious education, the Court issued an anti-funding ruling
and held that the state of Washington could constitutionally withhold fundtng. 7
The two cases look at first glance as though their outcomes are in opposition.
Locke and Zelman do, however, have important distinguishing characteristics. First,
the funding at issue in Zelman paid for education that was both religious and secular
in nature, while Locke involved funding of purely religious education in the form of
ministerial training. 8 This allowed the Locke Court to remain focused-as is their
responsibility-on the constitutional principles implicit in the Establishment Clause
and in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The majority in Zelman, however, became
distracted by extra-constitutional factors, such as Cleveland's failing schools, perhaps
because the religious elements of parochial elementary and high school education
appear more innocuous at first glance than does postsecondary ministerial training.
Second, the Court's analysis in Locke focused on a provision of the Washington
Constitution, 9 which includes a more strictly-worded notion of the separation of church
and state. 10 The reasoning of Zelman, on the other hand, was limited to the U.S.
Constitution. These holdings imply that establishment and free exercise concerns will
be weighed differently in each state, raising questions of federalism and consistency.
The Establishment Clause is a protection that should be emphatically maintained for
all citizens of the United States, regardless of their state of residence. In fact, the

5. Id. at 652-53. Rehnquist stated that "the program challenged here is a program of true private
choice" and went on to assert that "[t]here are no 'financial incentive[s ]' that 'ske[ w]' the program toward
religious schools .... The program here in fact creates financial disincentives for religious schools, with
private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community schools and one-third
the assistance given to magnet schools." Id. at 653-54 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986)). These statements do nothing to negate the constitutional problem
that religious schools are in fact receiving public funds. Furthermore, the manner in which Rehnquist
framed his statements ("private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community
schools") entirely contradicts his statements regarding diversion of funds through parents, and makes his
"indirectness" argument ring hollow. See discussion infra Part II.C.
6. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 n.9.
7. Id.
8. Mr. Davey did participate in mixed secular and religious education, in that he attended a religiously
affiliated college. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717. However, the only aspect of his education that was in dispute
in the case was that which was directed solely at ministerial training. Id. at 718.
9. WASH.CONST.art. I, § 11 states, in relevant part:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship,
shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person
or property on account of religion .... No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment.
I 0. Locke, 540 U.S. at 722 ("[llhe differently worded Washington Constitution draws a more stringent
line than that drawn by the United States Constitution .... ").
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Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Education, 11 specifically declared that the
Establishment Clause was to apply to the individual states. 12
The Zelman and Locke decisions, juxtaposed both in time and in subject matter,
indicate that the future of jurisprudence of public funding for religious schools will be
murky at best. The Court has seemingly conveyed that there is a standard to be
used-that of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution-except when one of fifty
potential other standards might be used-those of the various state constitutions.
Taking into account the fact that some states have statutes on point in addition to or
instead of constitutional provisions, the matter becomes even more confusing. This
area of the law has the potential to leave educators, legislators, and judges in every
state wondering about the permissibility of proposed programs and those already in
effect.
This Comment will examine the Zelman and Locke decisions, the flaws present in
the Court's reasoning of the two cases, and the resulting uncertainty left in their wake.
The Comment will then examine a sample of recent lower court decisions regarding
education funding to show how other states have dealt with the Zelman-Locke
confusion. Finally, the Comment will consider Maine's handling of this confusing area
of the law. 13
II. EDUCATION FuNDING: PLAY IN THE JOINTS OR GAPING HOLES?

Although both the Free Exercise 14 and Establishment Clauses 15 have been invoked
by various plaintiffs in education funding cases, 16 the issue of whether government
dollars may be used to fund religious schools more squarely implicates the
Establishment Clause because the issue is whether the government may sponsor
religion. 17 Lack of funding of religious schools does not hinder individuals in their

I I. 330 U.S. I (I 947).
12. The Court stated:
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the evils it was designed
forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions of the Court prior
to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth. The broad
meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its
decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth
Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action
abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application and broad
interpretation to the "establishment of religion" clause.
Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).
13. Although plaintiffs in various cases have advanced creative arguments such as those based on equal
protection and free speech claims, this Comment is more narrowly focused on the religion clauses-in
particular the Establishment Clause-as they relate to religious education funding jurisprudence.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].").
15. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion.").
16. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I (1993); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (I 983); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947).
1999ME60,iJ22, 728A.2d 127, 135-36. TheBagleyCourt
17. SeeBagleyv.RaymondSch.Dep't,
articulated that:
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ability to practice religion, and the Free Exercise Clause is therefore not implicated as
directly as is the Establishment Clause. 18 The mere refusal of the government to
provide funding does not hinder an individual's ability to practice religion. 19
In order to make a free exercise argument that would have even a chance at
success under accepted First Amendment jurisprudence, a plaintiff would have to show
that sending one's children to a sectarian school is an important aspect of his or her
faith, and that he or she could not adequately practice such faith otherwise. This
argument has not arisen in education funding jurisprudence to date; 20 even if it did, its
success would be questionable because the Court has articulated that, while a right
such as exercising one's religion may be fundamental, the government is not required
to subsidize a fundamental right. 21 For this reason, while the Free Exercise Clause is
ofrelevant concern here-that is, both federal and state governmental actors must be
careful not to infringe on citizens' ability to practice their respective faith, be it
Judaism, Buddhism, or Atheism 22-most of the in-depth analysis in this area of the law
has focused on the Establishment Clause.

A. The History of the Establishment Clause in Education FundingEverson to Agostini
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the area of education funding traces back
to the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education, 23 the first case in which the

The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from supporting or advancing religion
and from forcing religion, even in subtle ways, on those who choose not to accept it. It has
no role in requiring government assistance to make the practice ofreligion more available
or easier. It simply does not speak to governmental actions that fail to support religion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
I 8. The Law Court in Bagley noted that "[i]t is well established that there is no substantial burden
placed on an individual's free exercise ofreligion where a law or policy merely operates so as to make the
practice of [the individual's] religious beliefs more expensive." Id. ,r 18, 728 A.2d at 134 (internal
quotation marks omitted); cf Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,412 (1963)(Douglas, J., concurring). The
Free Exercise Clause is of concern in education-funding cases because it represents the limit a government
entity may approach when addressing Establishment Clause concerns. For instance, if a state decided to
charge families a tax for sending their children to religious schools and paying for that tuition
independently, or otherwise prevented families from sending their children to religious schools, such state
action would violate the Free Exercise Clause. A mere refusal of the government to affirmatively fund
religious education does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
19. The Court "ha[s] held in several contexts that a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise
ofa fundamental right does not infringe the right .... " Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540,549 (1983).
20. Although the Plaintiff in Locke did assert that he felt a religious calling to enter the ministry, he did
not claim that he would otherwise be fundamentally unable to practice his faith. See Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712, 721 (2004).
21. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545 ("This Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit ... to a
person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.").
22. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,598 (1989) ("Perhaps in the early days of the
Republic [the religion clauses] were understood to protect only the diversity within Christianity, but today
they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to 'the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent
of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism."') (quoting Wallace v. Jaffiee, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (I 985))
(emphasis added).
23. 330 U.S. I (I 947).
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Establishment Clause was explicitly applied to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24 In Everson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey program
reimbursing parents for the cost of transporting their children to and from both secular
and religious private schools. 25 The Court, in upholding the program, articulated a
clear and strict interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 26
Two decades later, the Court decided Board of Education v. Allen, 21 in which it
was found permissible for the State of New York to require public schools to lend
textbooks to students attending religious schools 28 because the benefit involved was
one to the students rather than to the religious schools. 29 The Court highlighted the
fact that ''the Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the
benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard for their religious affiliation .... " 30
From there, the Court's analysis of education funding under the Establishment
Clause shifted its focus, beginning with Lemon v. Kurtzman. 31 Rather than examining
the benefit to the public from the program in question, the Court began to look at a
program's benefit to religious institutions. 32 In Lemon, the State of Pennsylvania
instituted a program whereby private schools, both secular and religious, were
reimbursed for certain secular expenses. 33 The Court struck down the program 34 and
articulated a new test for determining the. constitutionality of funding under the
Establishment Clause. 35 The Court announced that, for state action to be permissible
under the Establishment Clause, it "must have a secular legislative purpose; ... its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
[and] the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion. " 36
The application of the Lemon test, however, has been fraught with instability and
confusion. Sporadically, the Court has used it to strike down programs involving
public funding assistance for religious schools. 37 In one of those cases, Committee for

24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id. at 15-16 ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least ...
[that] [n ]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."). One
commentator noted, "Everson is clear and unyielding in its language[;) ... the Court made a robust
antiestablishment statement." Virginia Chase Crocker, Note, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: The
Establishment Clause and the Fight/or School Vouchers, 58 ARK.L. REV.395,408 (2005).
27. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
28. Id. at 238.
29. Id. at 243-44 ("[N]o funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit
is to parents and children, not to schools.").
30. Id. at 242.
31. 403U.S.602(1971).
32. Id. at 615.
33. Id. at 609.
34. Id. at 607.
35. Id. at 612-13.
36. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
37. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (holding that programs
allowing public school teachers to teach certain classes in private religious schools "have the 'primary or
principal' effect of advancing religion, and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment Clause .... ");
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,363 (1975) ("[T]he direct loan of instructional material and equipment
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Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 38 the Court considered the
constitutionality of a New York statute that provided, as a means of offsetting the cost
of tuition, income tax benefits to the parents of students attending nonpublic
institutions, including parochial, elementary, and secondary schools. 39 The Court held
that "[i]n the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived
from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological
purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is invalid." 40 The
Nyquist Court went on to imply that aid would be similarly unconstitutional even if
diverted through an "ingenious plan[] for channeling aid to sectarian schools" through
parents. 41
Despite the Court's statements in Nyquist, its application of the Lemon test in other
cases has resulted in decisions upholding state funding of religious education. 42 At
times, the Court addressed issues and fact patterns that were similar to those of
previous cases, only to arrive at seemingly opposite, and therefore confusing,
outcomes. For instance, in Mueller v. Allen, 43 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute
that permitted parents to deduct education-related expenses in the computation of their
state income taxes, regardless of whether their children attended secular or religious
schools. 44 The Mueller Court, perhaps questionably, attempted to distinguish Nyquist,
focusing in part on the fact that tax statutes have historically been given a higher
degree of deference by the courts. 45 Also, in Agostini v. Felton, 46 the Court found it
permissible for public school teachers to spend time, paid for with government funds,
teaching in private religious schools. 47 However, in doing so, the Court explicitly

has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious
characterofthe schools benefiting .... "); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 794 (1973) (holding that repair grants, tuition reimbursement grants, and tax benefits to parents of
children attending private religious schools failed the "effect" prong of the Lemon test and were therefore
unconstitutional).
38. 413 U.S. 756.
39. Id. at 764.
40. Id. at 780.
41. Id. at 785.
42. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (I 993)(holding that the salary of sign
language interpreter in religious school may be paid for with public funds); Witters v. Wash. Dep' t of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a grant to aid blind college student in studying to become
a pastor); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (allowing state income tax deductions for the cost of
transportation, materials, and tuition at religious schools).
43. 463 U.S. 388.
44. Id. at 391,403.
45. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-97 n.6. The Mueller Court stated:
While the economic consequences of the program in Nyquist and that in this case may be
difficult to distinguish, we have recognized on other occasions that "the form of the [State's
assistance to parochial schools must be examined] for the light that it casts on the
substance." The fact that the Minnesota plan embodies a "genuine tax deduction" is thus
of some relevance, especially given the traditional rule of deference accorded legislative
classifications in tax statutes.
Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,614 (1971)).
46. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
4 7. Id. The Agostini Court stated:
We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial
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overruled its prior holding in Aguilar v. Felton, 48 in which the Court had, twelve years
earlier, struck down New York City's use of federal money to fund a program under
which public school teachers had provided instruction and guidance in religious
schools. 49
The result of the Court's inconsistency was a collection of rulings that made for
confusing, unclear precedent. 50 This was, perhaps, caused in part by the Court's
reluctance to either renounce or adhere to the Lemon test. 51 For instance, in Nyquist,
the Court indicated that the prongs of the Lemon test should only be "viewed as
guidelines." 52 Thereafter, the Court has also said in other cases that the Lemon test is
"no more than [a] helpful signpost[)," 53 and that the Court would not be bound by that
or any other test. 54
Rather than either adhering to the Lemon test or simply renouncing it, the Court
attempted to modify it in Agostini, 55 arguably adding to the confusion surrounding
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for lower courts. 56 The Agostini Court effectively
condensed the three prongs of the Lemon test into a single "effect" test; the
entanglement prong became folded into an effect analysis, and the purpose prong was

instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the
Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools
by government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those
present here.
Id. at 234-35.
48. Id. at 235. ("[W]e must acknowledge that Aguilar . .. [is] no longer good law.").
49. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,414 (1985). Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan said:
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City ofNew York, the program remains
constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving the aid,
and to the constitutional principles that they implicate---that neither the State nor Federal
Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally ....
Id.
50. For example, in one recent case, Justice Thomas lamented, "This case would be easy if the Court
were willing to abandon the inconsistent guideposts it has adopted for addressing Establishment Clause
challenges." Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
51. Indeed, the Court recently stated that "[ mJany of our recent cases simply have not applied the
Lemon test." Id. at 686 (majority opinion).
52. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31 (quoting Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,678 (1971)).
53. Muellerv. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,394 (1983)(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
54. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,679 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.").
55. Crocker, supra note 26, at 413 ("[T]he Court ... repackaged the Lemon test by folding the inquiry
of excessive entanglement into the inquiry of whether or not the government program had the impermissible
effect of inhibiting or aiding religion.").
56. The Justices themselves, while certainly not confused about the Lemon test, per se, were perhaps
unable to coalesce around a sufficiently clear and workable methodology for its use in education funding
cases. The muddled nature of this area of the law, then, perhaps has enabled the Justices to arrive at
holdings that are to some extent ideologically convenient for them. With a precisely defined set of workable
standards, the Court would be constrained to deciding cases in line with precedent. However, with the array
of cases using, modifying, and ignoring the Lemon test, there is precedent available for pretty much any
proposition regarding education funding that one favors.
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simply overlooked. 57 In doing so, the Court further worsened the instability
surrounding the subject area. 58
B. The Proper Reading of the Establishment Clause

The Court has become mired in confusion regarding the Establishment Clausedeveloping, modifying, and at times ignoring the Lemon test, and seems uncertain as
to how to proceed. Constitutional principles would be better served by a return to a
more streamlined approach. At its core, the Establishment Clause bars the government
from imposing religion on its citizens directly or indirectly: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion .... " 59 To say that the Establishment
Clause merely prohibits the government from, for example, authorizing an official state
church ignores the fact that the clause is not worded precisely to refer to such state
action. Thus, it can and should be deemed as a broad prohibition against various and
subtle ways in which government action could be perceived as supportive of religion.
Historically, it certainly cannot be said that all of the Framers were in agreement
as to what would and would not constitute a government "establishment" ofreligion.
There were those who advocated direct funding of training for the clergy, a sentiment
that was acceptable in the far more ideologically homogeneous setting of the nineteenth
century. Today, however, in a society that is more pluralistic than any of the Framers
could possibly have imagined, it would be wiser to follow the sentiments of those who
foresaw a need to take a more separationist approach. Thomas Jefferson, for instance,
called for a "wall of separation between church and state," 60 in order to allow
individuals the freedom to worship (or not worship) as they so chose. James Madison
also viewed religion as something which "must be left to the conviction and conscience
of every man[,]" 61 rather than imposed by the government.

57. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,234 (1997). The Court elaborated:
[The] program does not run afoul of any of the three primary criteria we currently use to
evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: It does not result in
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an
excessive entanglement. We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing
supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid
under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian
schools by government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as
those present here.
Id. at 234-35.
58. See William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000)
("[T]he Court's commitment to its announced doctrines is tenuous at best. Every new case accepted for
argument presents the very real possibility that the Court might totally abandon its previous efforts and start
over."); Steven D. Smith, The Iceberg of Religious Freedom: Sub-Surface Levels of Nonestablishment
Discourse, 38 CREIGHTONL. REv. 799, 800 (2005) (referring to Establishment Clause jurisprudence as a
"chaotic mass of modem precedents").
59. U.S. CONST.amend. I (emphasis added).
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. I, I 802), available at
http://www.usconstitution.net/jeffwall.html.
61. JAMESMADISON,Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THEWRITINGS
OFJAMESMADISON183 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I, app.
at 64 (1947).
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These separationist sentiments highlight two very important rationales for the
existence of the Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution, and its important role
in the success of our constitutional government. In prohibiting governmental support
of religion, the Establishment Clause both ensures that individual citizens perceive that
their beliefs are respected as much as the beliefs of others, and that they in turn respect
the government. 62 The Establishment Clause also limits the risk of potentially
disruptive religious conflict. 63
In keeping with these Jeffersonian and Madisonian views, the Court in Everson
correctly stated that the Establishment Clause forbids the government from "pass[ing]
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. " 64
Additionally, the Court articulated that "[ n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 65 The fact that these
strongly worded statements appear in an opinion ultimately upholding a challenged
funding program helps to delineate where the line between permissible and
impermissible funding should be drawn; the program at issue in Everson used state
funds to cover the transportation expenses of students attending secular and religious
schools, but was not allocated to parochial school tuition. The connection between
expenditures for buses and religious indoctrination is quite attenuated, and thus the
government funding is permissible. Meanwhile, the connection between parochial
school tuition and religious teachings is much closer and thus should be subject to the
separationist logic of Everson.
Clarity from the Supreme Court on public funding of religious educationalthough it has been sorely lacking, primarily because of the confusion surrounding the
Lemon test-is of utmost importance. While many school funding cases in recent
years have involved state constitutional provisions, 66 the majority of case law on the
subject has centered on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 67 Indeed,
Zelman was decided entirely based on the U.S. Constitution, and while the reasoning
of Locke examined a state constitutional provision, the Court also endeavored to
determine whether that Washington State Constitutional provision was permissible
under the U.S. Constitution. In the interest of stability going forward in this area of the

62. Justice Black explained:
The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country,
showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the
inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of
those who held contrary beliefs.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962).
63. One of the purposes of the Establishment Clause is to "protect[] the Nation's social fabric from
religious conflict .... " Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
65. Id. at 16.
66. Rita-Anne O'Neill, The School Voucher Debate After Zelman: Can States Be Compelled to Fund
Sectarian Schools Under the Federal Constitution?, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1397, 1398 (2003) ("The most widely
discussed state challenges involve individual state constitutional provisions that require a more stringent
separation of church and state than the federal Establishment Clause.").
67. Even in those cases involving state constitutional provisions, those provisions are, in tum,
necessarily examined under the Federal Constitution as well.
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law, all parties involved would be best served by clear guidance from the Court as to
how to interpret the Establishment Clause in light of the Free Exercise Clause. As the
Court has strayed further and further from the text and rationale of the Establishment
Clause, any guidance provided for lower courts has become increasingly murky. A
better course of action, then, would be to return to a more simplified analysis, focusing
on the text of the clause itself, and its Jeffersonian and Madisonian roots, as the Court
did in Everson. Unfortunately, the Court instead chose to muddy the waters further in
two recent Establishment Clause cases: Zelman and Locke.
C. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, decided in 2002, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a divided Court, upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship
Program. 68 The program, which provided tuition aid for primary and secondary
students in school districts "under federal court order requiring supervision and
operational management of the district by the state superintendent[]," 69 allowed
families in the failing Cleveland school district to send their children to private secular
schools, private religious schools, or neighboring public schools, and to use
government-issued vouchers to offset tuition costs at those schools. 70 The use of
program vouchers at private religious schools prompted a group of Ohio taxpayers to
challenge the program, alleging that it violated the Establishment Clause. 71
Although both the district court 72 and the court of appeals 73 found that the Pilot
Project Scholarship Program ran afoul of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court
upheld the program. 74 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the
program had a valid secular purpose, while not having the effect of advancing religion.
In order to arrive at this conclusion, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist twisted the issue
at hand and based his logic less on principles of law than on legally irrelevant facts.
Rather than analyzing the use of public funds for religious education and whether
that amounts to a government endorsement ofreligion, Rehnquist focused on statistics
pertaining to the educational failures of the Cleveland public school system, and on the
fact that the money in question found its way to parochial schools by way of parents'
private choices. While the statistics regarding the academic failure of the Ohio public
school system may be sympathetic, they are not relevant to a constitutional analysis of
whether state action violates the Establishment Clause. 75

68. 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002).
69. Id. at 644-45 (quoting OHIOREV.CODEANN.§ 33 I 3.975(A)(Anderson 1999 and Supp. 2000)).
70. Id. at 646 ('Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need. Families with incomes
below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition
up to $2,250.").
71. Id. at 648.
72. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
73. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
74. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663.
75. Justice Stevens, in his Zelman dissent, stated, "[T]he severe educational crisis that confronted the
Cleveland City School District when Ohio enacted its voucher program is not a matter that should affect
our appraisal of its constitutionality." Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens went on to say
that "the emergency may have given some families a powerful motivation to leave the public school system
and accept religious indoctrination that they would otherwise have avoided, but that is not a valid reason
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Rehnquist's focus on the fact that Ohio's program was one of "private
choice"-that is, parents could choose whether or not to send their children to religious
schools-is similarly irrelevant to a proper Establishment Clause analysis. 76 The fact
that parents chose the schools at which to use their vouchers does nothing to remove
the essential problem that the government was impermissibly funding religious
education. 77 Unfortunately, the manner in which Rehnquist approached Zelman
resulted in a very important and influential opinion concerning a currently contentious
area of law that lacks the intellectual rigor and constitutional precision needed to be
helpful, persuasive, and fully respected as precedent. Rather, the holes in its logic
leave it vulnerable to intellectual critique.
In initially presenting the issue before the Court in Zelman, Rehnquist stated as a
truism that the program at issue was enacted "for the valid secular purpose of providing
educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school
system." 7s While that may be true, Rehnquist went no further in examining whether
this actually was a secular purpose, and if so, why it was valid. Even if his reasoning
was relatively simple on this point, it should have been articulated in the opinion. If
he had done so, Rehnquist would have penned an opinion far more capable of
clarifying much confusion, and more worthy of judicial respect for years to come.
Having quickly and cursorily stated that the Ohio program had a valid secular
purpose, Rehnquist continued by stating that the question before the Court thus became
"whether the Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden 'effect' of advancing or
inhibiting religion." 79 Later in the opinion, Rehnquist reframed that issue further,
stating "[t]he Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing parents into
sending their children to religious schools ... _..so However, these two manners of
framing the issue at hand are not the same. Whether or not coercion is present is
simply one of several factors involved in an analysis of the effect of state action under
the Establishment Clause.s 1 The fact that state action does not coerce citizens does not
automatically rule out impermissible effect under the Establishment Clause and

for upholding the program." Id. at 684-85.
76. The Court has previously stated that choice cannot save an otherwise unconstitutional program;
"[t]he absence of any element of coercion ... is irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment
Clause." Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973).
77. Justice Stevens, in his Zelman dissent, stated:
[T]he voluntary character of the private choice to prefer a parochial education over an
education in the public school system seems to me quite irrelevant to the question whether
the government's choice to pay for religious indoctrination is constitutionally permissible .
. . . [nhe Court seems to have decided that the mere fact that a family that cannot afford a
private education wants its children educated in a parochial school is a sufficient
justification for this use of public funds. . .. [T]he Court's decision is profoundly
misguided.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also articulated that '"parental choice'
cannot significantly alleviate the constitutional problem" with the Ohio voucher program. Id. at 717
(Breyer, J ., dissenting).
78. Id. at 649.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 655-56.
81. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 ("The absence
of any element of coercion, however, is irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment Clause.").
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therefore confer on that action a stamp of constitutionality. Indeed, state action which
does not coerce could nonetheless have an impermissible effect for other reasons. In
order to persuasively show the constitutionality of the program, Rehnquist should have
examined whether any features of the program had an effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. 82 Instead, Rehnquist considered the lack of coerciveness in the program to
be conclusive as to its effect. That narrow approach has no constitutional support. The
level of analysis Rehnquist gave to this particular part of the opinion leaves his logic
open to much criticism, and therefore is less likely to hold up as clear, helpful
precedent in the future.
Also problematic is the fact that Rehnquist referred to the primary effect of state
action in this context. 83 A primary effect analysis does not get to the core of what the
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. Whether state action runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause should be based on more than simply the primary effect of that
action; indeed, the analysis should be far more thorough. Any one state action could
potentially have innumerable effects, and if any of them advance or inhibit religion,
that state action should be declared unconstitutional. 84 For instance, if a government
voucher program that includes religious schools has the multiple effects of benefiting
churches, increasing the number ofreligious adherents in a community, and providing
students with adequate education, the first two effects should not be judicially
overlooked merely because one could plausibly say that the effect on education is
primary. If the remaining effects are truly present in a particular community, they
provide justification for a program to be declared unconstitutional.
Rehnquist attempted to bolster his argument by lamenting the failing public
schools in Cleveland, including statistics showing this failure. 85 While it may be
deplorable for public school children to be subject to substandard education, that fact
should not find its way into Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Nowhere in the
Establishment Clause--or anywhere in the Constitution, for that matter-is there an
express or implied exception for instances in which a group of people are particularly
sympathetic. 86 Admittedly, an issue as heated as substandard education can cause one

82. In fact, some scholars might argue that the Pilot Project Scholarship Program-and other voucher
programs like it-inhibit religion. For instance, one could argue that involvement with the government
dilutes the religiosity of parochial education, or even dilutes religion generally. As a specific example,
Florida's Opportunity Scholarship Program allowed voucher funds to go to religious schools as long as
those schools agreed "not to compel any student attending the private school [by benefit of the voucher
program] to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, orto worship." FLA.STAT.§ 229.0537(4)(1999),
invalidated by Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (current version at FLA. STAT.§ 1002.38
(2007)). Such restrictions dilute and hinder the manner in which religious institutions are able to
indoctrinate their young followers. This indoctrination is a key facet of the success of organized religion,
and, as long as not funded by the government, is entirely permissible. Indeed, for the State of Florida to
include this limitation raises serious free exercise questions. Without it, of course, the state believed it
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Hence the decades-old and confusing concern with that
elusive concept of"entanglement."
83. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 660 (dismissing as arbitrary one suggested way "to assess
primary effect"). Justice O'Connor also referred to the "primary effect" examination in her concurrence.
536 U.S. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. See supra Part ll.B.
85. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
86. Justice Souter, in his Zelman dissent, reminded the Court that '"constitutional lines have to be
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to "blur the line between constitutionality and social concerns," 87 but Supreme Court
Justices are charged with the difficult but very important task of avoiding the
temptation of being swayed by sympathetic but glaringly extra-constitutional
reasoning. 88 The fact that Cleveland's schools were failing simply does not justify
Ohio's allocation of taxpayer dollars to religious schools in order to solve the problem.
As Justice Souter said in his Zelman dissent, "If there were an excuse for giving short
shrift to the Establishment Clause, it would probably apply here. But there is no
excuse. Constitutional limitations are placed on government to preserve constitutional
values in hard cases, like these." 89
Rehnquist also departed from the examination of the text of the Establishment
Clause by highlighting the fact that the state of Ohio did not, under the Pilot Project
Scholarship Program, give funds directly to religious schools. 9° Funds were sent to
families in voucher form, and those families then chose to which educational institution
to send their children, and thus to which institution to allocate the voucher representing
government funds. The result, however, is no different than if the state had funded
religious schools directly. Both through direct funding and through voucher programs,
religious institutions receive money from public coffers-money that is collected
compulsorily from the general population-and this is what the Establishment Clause
was designed to prohibit.
Further, Rehnquist's reasoning that the Ohio program involved indirect funding
is even more disingenuous in light of the fact that the funding is only indirect because
of a procedural formality; only when families choose to send children to private
schools are "checks made payable to the parents who then endorse the checks over to
the chosen school." 91 The implication of this reasoning, then, is that states may take
advantage of a constitutional "loop-hole" and appropriate public funds to religious
organizations as long as those funds are first diverted through individuals. 92 In fact,
those individuals need not ever have genuine control over the funds in question.
Parents are not permitted to use the funds in any way, other than signing them over to
the school they have chosen for their children, which may, under Zelman, be a religious
school. Simply signing over an uncashed check to a religious school will suffice for
indirectness under Zelman-a result that entirely ignores the Court's determination in

drawn, and on one side of every one of them is an otherwise sympathetic case that provokes impatience
with the Constitution and with the line. But constitutional lines are the price of constitutional
government."' Id. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 254 (1997).
87. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1399.
88. Rehnquist has, in the past, joined a dissent by Justice Scalia, which spoke approvingly of "those
who adhere to the Court's ... traditional view that the Constitution bears its original meaning and is
unchanging." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 371-72 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Therefore, it is curious that he would then write an opinion that is far from based on the Constitution's
"original" and "unchanging" meaning.
89. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 652-53 (majority opinion).
9 I. Id. at 646.
92. As one commentator has noted, "Zelman indicates that, so long as the programs exhibit
governmental neutrality toward religion, indirect aid programs are permissible under the Establishment
Clause, regardless of whether or not tuition money is ultimately diverted for religious purposes." Patrick
M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for
Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA.L. REV. I, 12 (2005).
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Nyquist that the constitutionality of government aid to religious schools could not be
saved by an "ingenious plan[] for channeling state aid to sectarian schools" 93 through
parents, rather than funding religious schools directly. 94
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not offer sound legal reasoning as to why the Pilot
Project Scholarship Program was constitutional. 95 As distressing as that may be,
perhaps more problematic is the fact that the Zelman opinion left educators and policy
makers with little guidance as to how to proceed in this area. Rehnquist "did not
answer the question of whether a state or municipality must include sectarian schools
in a school voucher program that provides aid to public and non-sectarian private
schools." 96 In fact, the Court "substantially weakened the mandate [of the
Establishment Clause] when it decided that neutrality and 'true private choice' were
the criteria used in evaluating the constitutionality of government programs. " 97
D. Locke v. Davey

Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote for the Court two years later, in Locke v.
Davey, 98 which resulted in the lack of public funding for religious education, 99 and
provided a counterpoint-although not clearly articulated-for
the excessively
permissive tone of the Zelman decision. Locke centered on the State of Washington's
Promise Scholarship Program, which provided funds for college students who had
achieved academic success in high school 1°0 and demonstrated financial need. 101 The
program allowed students to spend their scholarship funds at eligible, accredited

93. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785 (1973).
94. Toe Nyquist Court's denunciation of government aid to sectarian schools was unambiguous:
"Special tax benefits ... cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality established by the decisions of
this Court. To the contrary, insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their children to
sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious institutions."
Id. at 793.
95. One commentator has surmised, generally:
[M]aybe the lawyers and scholars and judges are not so much deriving their conclusions
from the arguments they publicly offer, but rather are (consciously or unconsciously)
selecting from a rich batch of rhetorical resources whatever materials and arguments operate
to support outcomes that they are already predisposed to favor on other grounds. Maybe
premises are being derived from conclusions, not the other way around.
Smith, supra note 58, at 801.
96. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1409.
97. Crocker, supra note 26, at 395-96.
98. Many were surprised that Chief Justice Rehnquist supported, and even wrote, the separationist
opinion in Locke. See, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Room for "Play in the Joints "-Locke v. Davey, 33 J.L.
& EDUC.457 (2004) (speculating that perhaps Rehnquist' s "fear of federal encroachments on states' rights
may have simply overridden [his] support of government accommodation toward religion").
99. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
I 00. Toe parameters of academic success were defined as follows:
To be eligible for the scholarship, a student must meet academic, income, and enrollment
requirements. A student must graduate from a Washington public or private high school and
either graduate in the top 15% of his graduating class, or attain on the first attempt a
cumulative score of 1,200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I or a score of27 or
better on the American College Test.
Id. at 716.
IOI. Id. ("Toe student's family income must be less than 135% of the State's median.").

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 525 2007

526

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:2

institutions, 102 including sectarian colleges (a point not before the Court), but excluding
the pursuit of degrees in theology. 103 After his Promise Scholarship had been revoked
because of his pursuit of a degree in devotional theology, Mr. Davey filed suit,
asserting that the exclusion violated his rights of free exercise, establishment, and free
speech. 104 The State of Washington, however, contended that, regardless of whether
funding ofMr. Davey's religious education would violate the Establishment Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, the Washington Constitution's prohibition against funding
religion applied and the denial of funds it required did not violate his rights under the
U.S. Constitution. 105
Writing for a seven-member majority of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment "are frequently in tension[]," 106 but that "'there is room for play in the
joints' between them." 107 By falling back on this imprecise notion of the space
between what the Free Exercise Clause requires of government and what the
Establishment Clause forbids, Rehnquist failed to provide a clear and useful directive
for lower courts, particularly in light of the earlier Zelman decision. While Locke was
correctly decided in that it prevented public funds from subsidizing Davey's religious
education, the Court would have been wiser to state a more clear and forceful rationale,
rather than wade further into the murkiness that is their public funding of religious
educationjurisprudence. In fact, as one commentator noted, "[t]he Court's holding left
a great deal of uncertainty on when states may withhold benefits on the basis of
religion." 108
It has also been suggested that the Locke Court, realizing that state constitutional
amendments could increasingly become the focal point of arguments in school funding
cases, 109 was concerned that an accomodationist ruling-including a determination that
Washington's state constitutional prohibition against funding religion violated the Free
lead to states being compelled to
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution-would

I 02. Id. ("[T]he student must enroll 'at least halftime in an eligible postsecondary institution in the state
of Washington .... "' (quoting WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 250-80-020(12)(t))).
I 03. Id. ("[T]he student ... may not pursue a degree in theology ... while receiving the scholarship.").
104. Id. at 718.
105. At oral argument, counsel for the State of Washington articulated the following:
The line between funds for secular purposes and for religious purposes is a line that's been
recognized by this Court in various funding cases and in reviewing government activities .
. . . [SJ imply because the State of Washington is extending those values of the Establishment
Clause beyond direct funding into indirect funding does not convert those values into
hostility.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_ arguments/argument_ transcripts/02-1315 .pdf.
106. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
107. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970)).
I 08. Brett Thompson, Note, Locke v. Davey: The Fine Line Between Free Exercise and Establishment,
56 MERCERL. REV. 1093, 1093 (2005).
109. According to one commentator, "almost all school litigation involving church/state questions has
been based on interpretations of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This may change
significantly, given the vitality of state antiestablishment provisions solidified in Locke combined with the
Court's relaxed interpretation of the Establishment Clause." McCarthy, supra note 98, at 464.
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include religious schools in voucher programs. 110 Under such reasoning, the holding
in Locke served to avoid this negative potential outcome. Questions at oral argument
in Locke indicate that this was indeed a key factor for the Justices; that is, they seemed
concerned with maintaining the rights of states to decide whether or not to include
religious schools in such programs. For instance, Justice O'Connor asked several
times about the Promise Scholarship Program's possible similarities to an elementary
or secondary school voucher program, 111 the likely format in which future debates over
those states' rights issues would arise. If state courts are left to tackle an increasing
number of cases dealing with these issues, then states will potentially have more
control over how these issues will be resolved. One commentator has suggested that
the applicability of Locke, a case dealing with a university scholarship program, to
elementary and secondary school voucher programs in general may be limited. 112
The Locke Court did, however, suggest that the requirement for future litigants
might be to show that, in failing to provide funds in a given context, the state showed
animus toward religion. 113 This is a high hurdle-and an appropriate one-for future
plaintiffs seeking to use state funds at religious institutions. This properly allows states
the flexibility to choose not to fund sectarian instruction because of anti establishment
concerns. Indeed, a state would have to enact a quite egregious statute or
constitutional provision in order to reach the point of actual "animus" toward religion.
Ill. APPLICATION OF ZELMAN AND LOCKE
The seemingly competing Zelman and Locke cases have been applied by courts
in various states, including Florida, New Hampshire, and Maine. Following an
analysis of the manner in which the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit have weighed these issues, Part IV of this Comment
goes on to examine the course taken in Maine.

110. "Justice Breyer referred to the implications of ruling in favor of Davey as 'breathtaking,' impacting
the way states allocate funds so that they cannot 'be purely secular' and 'they must fund all religions who
want' to engage in the same activity." Jason S. Marks, Spackle/or the Wall? Public Funding/or School
Vouchers After Locke v. Davey, 61 J. Mo. B. 150, 155-56 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52,
Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/02-1315.pdf).
ll I. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), available at
http:/ /www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_ arguments/argument_ transcripts/02-1315 .pdf.
112. See Shannon Black, Note, Locke v. Davey and the Death of Neutrality as a Concept Guiding
Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 19 Sr. JOHN'SJ. LEGALCOMMENT.337, 374-76 (2005).
[T]he Court took pains to limit Locke to its particular facts .... [A]t least one of the justices
in the Zelman majority expressed concern about the impact of a decision in Davey's favor
on school voucher plans already in place in several states that do exclude religious schools[;]
it is unlikely that the Court would reverse the trend it started in Locke in school vouchers
cases.
Id.
ll3. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 (holding that "we [do not] find ... in the operation of the Promise
Scholarship Program[] anything that suggests animus towards religion .... [W]e therefore cannot conclude
that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.").
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A. Bush v. Holmes

The State of Florida had an opportunity to struggle with the Zelman-Locke
precedents and the confusing issues those opinions have left in their wake in Bush v.
Holmes. 114 In that case, a group of voucher opponents attacked the constitutionality
of Florida's Opportunity Scholarship Program under Florida's state constitution. 115
Much like the Pilot Project Scholarship Program at issue in Zelman, Florida's voucher
program was created in response to what legislators saw as "failing" public schools, 116
rather than a lack of available public schools or for any other stated reason.
The validity of the Florida Constitution's so-called "no-aid" provision was in tum
questioned under the U.S. Constitution. 117 The Florida provision states that "[n]o
revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken
from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution. " 118 Voucher proponents argued that
either the Florida Constitution imposed greater restrictions on aid to religious schools
than does the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and thus should be
declared violative of the Free Exercise Clause and therefore unconstitutional, or that
the no-aid provision did not impose additional restrictions, and thus the Opportunity
Scholarship Program must be upheld under the reasoning of Zelman. 119 The District
Court of Appeal of Florida, on rehearing en bane, agreed that, if the two provisions
were coterminous, Zelman dictated that the program must be upheld. 120 However, it

114. 886 So.2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
115. When this litigation began, the plaintiffs advanced both federal and state constitutional arguments.
id. at 344. In 2000, the trial court found the Opportunity Scholarship Program to be impermissible; the
District Court of Appeal ofFlorida reversed, upheld the program, stated simply that the state legislature may
fund private school education if it deems such funding necessary, ignored the plaintiffs' constitutional
arguments, and remanded the case back to the trial court. Id. at 345. While on remand, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Zelman. Id. Based on the reasoning of Zelman, the plaintiffs dismissed their federal
constitutional claims and relied instead on state constitutional principles. id. The trial court found the
program violative of the state constitution, and entered an injunction preventing implementation of the
Opportunity Scholarship Program. Id. at 346.
116. The Florida Legislature construed that state's constitution as promising a high-quality education
for all students, a promise which the U.S. Constitution does not make. Id. at 347. Under the Opportunity
Scholarship Program, when Florida public schools were deemed to be "failing" for two years out of a four
year period, the legislature required that the schools notify parents and guardians of attendees of such
failure, and of their option to send their children to another, more successful public school, or to use state
funds (in the form of a voucher) to send their children to private school. Id. If a parent or guardian chose
the latter, the state issued a warrant payable to the parent, but mailed to the private school, at which point
the parent was to endorse the warrant over to the school. Id.
117. Id. at 344.
118. FLA.CONST.art. I,§ 3 (emphasis added).
119. Bush, 886 So. 2d at 344.
120. Id. at 359. The Bush court elaborated:
Ifwe were resolving this case purely on Establishment Clause principles, the fact that the
OSP program on its face has a religiously neutral purpose-to aid children in failing public
schools-and the fact that the OSP gives parents or guardians the freedom of choice in
selecting an alternative to a failing public school, would be dispositive factors, without
regard to whether a disbursement was made directly to a parent or guardian rather than the
school.
id.
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found that the Establishment Clause and the relevant part of the Florida Constitution
were not synonymous. 121 Accordingly, it struck down the Opportunity Scholarship
Program. Importantly, the court found the state constitutional provision to be more
restrictive than the Establishment Clause, 122 but not so much so that it ran afoul of the
Free Exercise Clause. 123 Apparently, Florida's no-aid provision fell in the vast "play
in the joints" 124 between the two clauses. 125
Ultimately, the Opportunity Scholarship Program, to the extent that program funds
found their way to religious schools, was struck down in Bush v. Holmes because it ran
afoul of the no-aid provision in Florida's state constitution. 126 The no-aid provision
itself was found to be acceptable under the Federal Free Exercise Clause as well as the
free exercise clause of the Florida Constitution. 127
The Bush court also asked the Florida Supreme Court to weigh in on the question
of whether the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program violated the Florida
constitution. 128 The reasoning under the no-aid language of the Florida Constitutionthat is, that no government funds may reach religious institutions either directly or
indirectly-is arguably also the appropriate reasoning to use under the Federal
Establishment Clause for alljurisdictions. 129 While the Florida Constitution included
the explicit "direct or indirect" language and the Federal Establishment Clause does
not, the Federal Establishment Clause was intended to provide the same protection, and
the "direct or indirect" concept should be deemed to be implied. 130

121. Id. at 344. The Bush court stated:
[W]e cannot read the entirety of article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution to be
substantively synonymous with the federal Establishment Clause, [and therefore] find the
appellants' arguments without merit .
. . . [T]he no-aid provision ... expands the restrictions in state aid and to religion by
specifically prohibiting the expenditure of public funds "directly or indirectly" to aid
sectarian institutions.
Id.

122. Id. at 359-60 ("We find it significant that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a
state constitutional provision substantially similar to Florida's no-aid provision is 'far stricter' than the
Establishment Clause." (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep'tofServs. for the Blind, 479 U.S. 481,489 (1986))).
123. Id. at 363.
124. The Supreme Court first coined the phrase "play in the joints" in upholding property tax exemptions
granted to religious organizations. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (I 970).
125. The Bush court stated that "there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but
not required by the Free Exercise Clause. This case involves that 'play in the joints' .... " Bush, 886 So.
2d at 364.
126. Id. at 344 ("There is no dispute in this case that state funds are paid to sectarian schools through
the OPS vouchers. Thus, we hold the OSP unconstitutional under the no-aid provision to the extent that
the OSP authorizes state funds to be paid to sectarian schools.").
127. Id.
128. Id. at 367.
129. The text of the Establishment Clause is as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST.amend. I (emphasis added). This text indicates that any law
thus respecting an establishment of religion will be unconstitutional. The Establishment Clause does not
merely prohibit laws respecting a "direct" establishment of religion. Therefore, both direct and indirect
funding should be considered impermissible under the Federal Constitution.
130. See discussion supra Part 11.8.
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B. Gary S. v. Manchester School District

Zelman and Locke were applied in a New Hampshire case as well, although
somewhat more tangentially. Unlike the programs at issue in the Zelman and Bush
litigation, Gary S. v. Manchester School District 131 did not involve a voucher program.
Rather, parents of a disabled child attending a private religious school contended that
their child should be entitled to "the panoply of services available to disabled public
school students," 132making the case fall more squarely, factually, under Locke. Among
other things, the parents argued that the ineligibility for services at a religious school
violated their child's free exercise rights. 133 The First Circuit disagreed, however, and
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Manchester School District. 134
The First Circuit prefaced its discussion of the plaintiffs' free exercise claim with
an acknowledgement that this area oflaw is murky at best, and that the U.S. Supreme
Court has not given lower courts adequate guidance as to how to properly resolve
religion cases such as this one. 135 Obviously, the Zelman and Locke opinions did not
provide lower courts with sufficient guidance on the topic.
What the court did take clearly from Zelman, however, is the view that states may
divert public funds to private schools, but are not required to do so. 136 Meanwhile,
Locke, which was factually more similar to the case, was mentioned only cursorily in
a footnote. 137
Ultimately, the First Circuit based its holding in favor of the Manchester School
District on the fact that the benefit sought by plaintiff was not generally available and
that it would be ''unreasonable and inconsistent to premise a free exercise violation"
on a benefit of such limited availability. 138 Accordingly, the opinion did not implicate
the "play in the joints" model as directly as other cases have, and the court did not

131. 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004).
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id. The plaintiffs also advanced due process and equal protection arguments, neither of which are
relevant to this Comment. The free exercise claim was the plaintiffs' lead argument. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 18 ("It is not always easy to predict what analytical framework the Supreme Court will apply
to the various, factually dissimilar free exercise cases that arise.").
136. Id. at 20 n.l ("To be sure, the Court has recently permitted a state legislature to provide for
attendance at private schools at public expense ifit so desires." (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002)) (emphasis added)).
137. In referring to Locke, the First Circuit said:
A further anomaly of such a holding would be that only persons such as appellants, with a
declared religious belief in the necessity of sending their children to private schools, would
be entitled under the First Amendment to the funding sought. Other students, including
those in secular private schools, would lack a right to such funding.
Id. at 20 n.3. It seems curious that the opinion did not expand on this concept, as it speaks directly to the
concept of state action favoring religion.
138. Id. The Gary S. court said:
[Our] methodology leaves all parents with ultimate recourse to the public schools whenever
the balance of services associated with attendance at a private school appears to them to be
unsatisfactory; but the option thus available can necessitate their having to choose, as here,
between alternatives each of which may seem imperfect. In any event, we cannot say that
the federal government's structuring ofbenefits here violates appellants' free exercise rights.
Id. at 21.
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discuss Zelman and Locke at length. 139 It did, however, mention those two cases
enough to show the confusion they have caused and the bailing enormity of the
resulting "play in the joints" concept with which courts have been forced to grapple.

IV.

MAINE'S APPROACH

Since the passing of the Free High School Act 140 in 1873, Maine has been using
state funds to pay the education expenses of those students who reside in towns without
public high schools. 141 In 1981, the Maine Legislature excluded religious schools from
the receipt of those funds. 142 This prohibition is purely statutory; unlike most states,
Maine's constitution neither prevents the state government from allocating money to
religious institutions, nor does it protect citizens from being compelled to support
religion. 143 Accordingly, any legal battles involving Maine school funding in the
aftermath of Zelman and Locke will not include the same federal-state constitutional
arguments that were seen in Locke. Potentially, future school funding plaintiffs may
argue that the analysis of the Maine program falls more squarely under Zelman, in that
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is controlling of Establishment Clause
arguments. However, because the Locke Court analyzed federal, rather than state, free
exercise principles, this is the controlling precedent in determining how far a particular
state may permissibly go in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation before running
afoul of the Federal Free Exercise Clause.
A. Bagley v. Raymond School Department

In Bagley v. Raymond School Department, 144 which was decided before both
Zelman and Locke, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, upheld
Maine's education tuition program and its exclusion of religious schools from the
program. Under Maine's tuition program, 145 "students of parents residing in a school
district which neither maintains a secondary school nor contracts for secondary school
privileges may attend a school approved for tuition purposes." 146 A school may be
approved for tuition purposes "only if it ... [i]s a nonsectarian school in accordance
with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." 147 When a family

139. Both cases are mentioned briefly in footnotes. See id. nn. l & 3.
140. As of the writing of this Comment, the current Maine statute governing education is as follows:
In accordance with the Constitution of Maine, Article VIII, the Legislature shall enact the
laws that are necessary to assure that all school administrative units make suitable
provisions for the support and maintenance of the public schools. It is the intent of the
Legislature that every person within the age limitations prescribed by state statutes shall be
provided an opportunity to receive the benefits of a free public education.
ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2 (West 1993).
141. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1417.
142. Id. at 1418. The Maine statute dictates that "[a] private school may be approved for the receipt of
public funds for tuition purposes only if it ... [i]s a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution[.]" ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2951 (West 1993).
143. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1403.
144. 1999 ME 60, 728 A.2d 127.
145. See ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204(4) (West 1993).
146. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ,i 2, 728 A.2d at 130.
147. ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2951(2) (West 1993). This further emphasizes that analysis of
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chooses to send a child to an approved private school under this program, rather than
diverting funds through the family by way of a voucher, the school district in which the
family resides pays tuition directly to the private school. 148 Much like the program at
issue in Bush v. Hof mes, "funds ... emanate directly from the revenue of [the state]." 149
The Bagley family resided in Raymond, Maine, a town that did not have a
secondary school and did not contract to send its students to another school. 150 Upon
choosing to send their son to Cheverus High School, a religious school, and attempting
unsuccessfully to have the Cheverus tuition paid for by the town ofRaymond under the
Maine tuition program, the Bagley family filed suit, alleging that denial of such
funding violated their Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clause
rights. 151
The Law Court found that the exclusion of religious institutions in the Maine
tuition program did not violate the Bagleys' constitutional rights. 152 Setting up the
framework for the opinion, then-Justice Saufley, writing for the Law Court, clarified
that the court would presume that "the rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and Maine Constitution are coextensive" because neither of the parties
had alleged otherwise. 153
Concerning the Free Exercise Clause, the Law Court stated that a law merely
making the practice ofreligion more expensive does not place a "substantial burden"
on an individual's free exercise rights. 154 The Law Court added that the Bagleys were
"no more impaired in their efforts to seek a religious education for their sons than are
parents of children in school districts that provide only a free nonreligious education
in public schools. " 155 Accordingly, the state action (or, more pre"isely, non-action and
non-funding) at issue did nothing to interfere with the plaintiffs' ability to exercise their
religion. 156
The Establishment Clause was primarily relevant to the facts of the Bagley case
in that the state's choice to refuse to allocate tuition funds to sectarian schools was
based on the state's compliance with the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 157 The Law Court stated, however, that the plaintiffs' use of an

the Maine program falls under the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Maine's state
constitution does not include increased antiestablishment protections, and its relevant statute specifically
directs us to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
148. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, 'I[3, 728 A.2d at 130.
149. 886 So. 2d 340,346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
150. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, 'I[6, 728 A.2d at I 3 I.
151. Id. 'l['I[9, II, 728 A.2d at 131-32.
152. Id. 'I[ 72, 728 A.2d at 147.
153. Id. 'I[ 13, 728 A.2d at 132. This is different from the argument made in Locke; in that case, counsel
for the State of Washington explicitly argued that Washington's constitution heightened the separation of
church and state that is articulated in the U.S. Constitution.
154. Id. 'I[I 8, 728 A.2d at 134 ("(T]here is no substantial burden placed on an individual's free exercise
of religion where a law or policy merely operates so as to make the practice of [the individual's] religious
beliefs more expensive." (quoting Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd, 60 F .3d I 68, 171 (4th Cir. I 995))).
155. Id. 'I[ 18, 728 A.2d at 135.
156. Id. 'I[20, 728 A.2d at 135.
157. Id. 'II5, 728 A.2d at 131 ("The State does not dispute that its only justification for excluding
religious schools from the tuition program was compliance with the Establishment Clause.").
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Establishment Clause argument under the facts as presented was "misplaced" 158
because the Establishment Clause "simply does not speak to governmental actions that
fail to support religion" 159 and there is therefore "no support for the proposition that
the Establishment Clause prevents a state from refusing to fund religious schools." 160

B. Eulitt v. Maine, Department of Education
Eulitt v. Maine, Department of Education 161 involved the same Maine tuition
program and exclusion of religious schools that was at issue in Bagley. However,
unlike Bagley, Eulittwas decided after the issuance of the Zelman and Locke opinions,
and was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, rather than
by the Law Court. In Eulitt, as in Bagley, a family that was denied state funding for
tuition at a religious school asserted that such denial violated their constitutional rights;
specifically, the Eulitts made Equal Protection and Establishment Clause arguments. 162
The Eulitts also argued that, in the aftermath of the Zelman decision, Maine's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause as prohibiting public funding of education
at religious schools was no longer compatible with accepted Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. 163 The First Circuit's analysis of this argument highlighted the chaos
in which the Supreme Court left this area of the law after Zelman and Locke. 164 For
instance, the opinion specifies that the district court "declined to consider the effects
of Zelman and [Locke ]," 165 when considering the current propriety ofMaine' s approach
to the issue, and that the lower court was not in error in doing so. 166 The First Circuit
distinguished the Zelman decision as not binding, in part because of the Supreme

158. Id. ',i21, 728 A.2d at 135.
159. Id.1122, 728 A.2d at 136.
160. Id.
I 6 I. 3 86 F .3d 344 (I st Cir. 2004 ).
162. Id. at 347-48. In asserting an equal protection claim, the plaintiffs made the argument-distinct
from their free exercise argument-that they were being discriminated against on the basis of their religious
beliefs and that, because religion is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny should be applied. Id. at 353-54.
However, the court, citing Locke, stated that such an argument was misguided; any state action that is
permissible under the Free Exercise Clause can be subject only to rational basis scrutiny under an equal
protection analysis. Id. at 354. The plaintiffs conceded that, using rational basis scrutiny, their equal
protection claim must fail. Id. at 356.
163. Id. at 347-48. The First Circuit, in determining whether stare decisis precluded relitigation of the
matter, focused on its earlier decision in Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. I 999), in which the court
"rejected [an] equal protection challenge because Maine had shown a compelling interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation through the exclusion of sectarian schools from its secondary education
tuition program." Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 348 (citing Strout, 178 F.3d at 64). The Strout court speculated, but
did not hold, that "if Maine's proffered interest had been found to depend upon an erroneous understanding
of the Establishment Clause ... then the state's exclusion of sectarian schools from the tuition program
would not withstand scrutiny." Id. (citing Strout, 178 F.3d at 64 n.12). Also, the Strout court found "no
relevant precedent for using [the Establishment Clause's] negative prohibition as a basis for extending the
right of a religiously affiliated group to secure state subsidies." Strout, 178 F.3d at 64.
164. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 348 ("The Zelman opinion raises the distinct possibility that Strout's view of
Maine's asserted interest depended upon an incorrect interpretation of the Establishment Clause's
strictures.").
165. Id. at 349.
166. Id. ("We do not find fault with that cautious approach.").
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Court's focus on "the facts underlying the Cleveland voucher program," 167 and went
on to say that "[e]ven after Zelman and [Locke], it is fairly debatable whether or not
the Maine tuition program could survive an Establishment Clause challenge if the state
eliminated [the program's restrictions] and allowed sectarian schools to receive tuition
funds. ,,16s
The manner in which the First Circuit approached the Eulitt opinion suggests that
the Zelman Court, by relying heavily on the egregious condition of the public schools
in Cleveland, rather than a thorough examination of Establishment Clause principles,
issued an opinion that provides little guidance for lower courts. The implication is that
the First Circuit would have ruled differently in the Eulitt case if the Maine voucher
program were intended to fix a failing public school system, rather than simply to
provide secondary education to students in areas with no local high school at all. But
this implication reveals the deep flaws in the Zelman holding. Surely, the Establishment Clause could not have been intended to mean that state funding of religious
institutions is permissible only when sympathetic tales of economic woe or other
hardship pull at our heartstrings. Rather, the Establishment Clause should be equally
applicable to all instances of state funding ofreligious institutions regardless of the
rationale behind the funding.
The opinion in Eulitt also evinces that the Locke decision, much like the Zelman
decision, seems insufficiently clear to be used effectively by lower courts. The First
Circuit wrote, "[Locke] recognized that state entities, in choosing how to provide
education, may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive entanglement with
religion, even though the Establishment Clause may not require them to do so." 169
Apparently, the First Circuit is unclear, under Locke, as to just what the Establishment
Clause does require. This is precisely because the Locke opinion was indeed vague as
to what the Establishment Clause requires. If the Eulitt opinion had spoken of
legitimate state concerns and their connection with what the Establishment Clause does
not require, Locke could be said to be clear and valuable precedent on the issue of
public funding for religious education. However, the First Circuit's use of the phrase
"may not" rather than "does not" in the preceding quote shows that this is not the case.
Rather, lower courts have been left in a state of confusion as to how to proceed in this
subsection of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Although the Supreme Court
correctly decided Locke, it should have clearly enunciated the fact that the
Establishment Clause does require states to refrain from funding religious education,
and that, while the Free Exercise Clause establishes fundamental rights for citizens, the
government is not required to subsidize those rights. The First Circuit also arrived at
a proper determination in Eulitt, but was forced to do so based on arguably unclear
guidance from the Locke Court.
C. Anderson v. Town of Durham

The Maine Law Court was recently faced with an opportunity to revisit the issue
of school vouchers and religious schools, and to clarify this area of the law in Maine,

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 355.
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in the case of Anderson v. Town of Durham. 170 Backed by the Institute for Justice, 171
families from Durham, Minot, and Raymond-three Maine towns without public high
schools-filed suit, alleging that those towns' refusal to reimburse them for tuition
payments made to religious schools, pursuant to Maine's statutory exclusion of
religious schools from the tuition program, 172 violated their rights under the Free
Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 173 The
defendant towns filed a successful motion to dismiss, 174 and the plaintiffs appealed to
the Law Court.
The Anderson plaintiffs argued that, regardless of the fact that the defendant towns
were acting under color of state law, such action still constituted a violation of the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and thus the towns themselves were liable to the
plaintiffs for reimbursement of tuition. 175 The families contended that Maine's
statutory exclusion ofreligious schools from its tuition program impinged on their free
exercise rights 176 and that, in remedying this, the Law Court should overrule Bagley. 177
The plaintiffs also urged the Law Court to overrule Bagley regarding its Establishment
Clause holding. 178 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the equal protection reasoning of
Bagley was based on an understanding of the Establishment Clause that had been
invalidated by the Zelman case. 179
Although the plaintiffs favored overruling Bagley, they relied heavily on a
statement of the Law Court in that very case, that "[i]f the State's justification [for
excluding religious schools from the tuition program] is based on an erroneous
understanding of the Establishment Clause, its justification will not withstand any level

170. 2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944.
171. Institute for Justice, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/maine2/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
172. ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 20-A, § 2951(2) (West 1993).
173. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Julia and Kevin Anderson, et al. at 1, Anderson v. Town of
Durham, 2006 ME 39,845 A.2d 944 (No. CUM-04-591).
174. Anderson v. Town of Durham, No. Civ. A. CV-02-480, 2003 WL 21386768 (Me. Super. May 14,
2003), ajf'd, 2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 661 (2006). The Superior Court
(Crowley, J.) granted the motion on the grounds of municipal liability-i.e., that the action in question was
state, not local action-and res judicata-i.e., that plaintiffs here were in sufficient privity with the Bagley
plaintiffs as to bar the Anderson's claim. Id.
175. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 175, at 23.
176. Id. at 24.
177. Id. The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their case from the reasoning of Bagley by insisting that
the cases cited in Bagley all involved statutes that were facially neutral with respect to religion. Id. at 25.
However, the Bagley case was decided in 1999, well after the state legislature excluded religious schools
from the tuition program in section 2951 (2).
178. The plaintiffs made an awkward attempt at an Establishment Clause argument, essentially
reiterating their free exercise argument. Id. at 31. ("[The Bagley court's analysis] is correct in the sense that
the Establishment Clause does not require the government to affirmatively support religion, but incorrect
in not recognizing that the Clause has a role in preventing government action inhibiting or hindering
religion.").
179. Id. at 36-37.
The effect of Zelman is to render obsolete this Court's conclusion in Bagley that the
inclusion of religious schools from parents' choices was necessary to comply with the
Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause neither requires nor allows the exclusion .
. . . Thus, as this Court recognized in Bagley, there is no rational basis for the exclusion,
since it is based on an erroneous understanding of the Establishment Clause.
Id.
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of scrutiny" under an equal protection analysis. 180 In light of Zelman, the plaintiffs
argued, the Law Court's understanding of the Establishment Clause was in fact
erroneous, and should be subject to strict scrutiny and declared unconstitutional.
Justice Alexander, however, writing for the Law Court, determined that even though
under Zelman the Establishment Clause does not forbid states from funding religious
education, Locke more appropriately determines the appropriate level of equal
protection scrutiny, which is rational basis. 181 Because Justice Alexander found valid
justifications for the tuition program, he reasoned that the statute withstood rational
basis equal protection analysis. 182
The plaintiffs' free exercise argument, that the State may not limit school choice
on the basis of religion, failed as well. The Law Court determined that the tuition
program's exclusion of religious schools from the receipt of public funds was not
evidence of animosity toward religion, and that, even though the program incidentally
burdened a religious practice, rational basis scrutiny did not mandate that the state
offer a compelling governmental interest. 183 Furthermore, Justice Alexander suggested
that the statute would not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if subjected to strict
scrutiny. 184
Interestingly, Justice Alexander did not address separately the plaintiffs'
Establishment Clause argument, choosing instead to discuss it as it relates to the proper
level of scrutiny in the analysis of the equal protection claim. 185 On the one hand,
Zelman seems, quite obviously, to control the Establishment Clause analysis, thus
making a discussion by the Law Court superfluous at best and futile at worst.
However, in stating that there were "Establishment Clause concerns not necessarily
governed by Zelman," 186 Justice Alexander hinted at a potential rationale for more
clearly demarcating at least one side of the gap that is the "play in the joints," and it is
curious why he chose not to expand upon this.
V. THE VIABILITY OF MAINTAINING CURRENT POLICIES IN MAINE

The Supreme Court's lack of clear, usable precedent in the area of education
funding under the Establishment Clause-coupled with its opinions supported in large
part by non-legal, irrelevant arguments rather than valid constitutional principles-

180. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 1999 ME 60, ,r32, 728 A.2d 127, 138.
181. Justice Alexander stated, "Locke and Eulitt have clarified that when performing the equal protection
analysis in religious school funding cases, strict scrutiny applies only to the claim that the parents'
fundamental right to the free exercise of religion is implicated; all other claims of religious discrimination
are subject to rational basis scrutiny." Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 399, ,r56, 895 A.2d 944,
959-60, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 661 (2006).
182. Specifically, the state's justifications included "Establishment Clause concerns not necessarily
governed by Zelman, such as excessive entanglement between religion and state." Id. ,r57, 895 A.2d at
960. Justice Alexander further conjectured that various "conflicts between state curriculum, record keeping
and anti-discrimination requirements and religious teachings and religious practices in some schools ...
could result in significant entanglement of State education officials in religious matters ... [, which]
provides a rational basis to maintain the funding limitation .... " Id. ,r60, 895 A.2d at 961.
183. Id. ,r,r
52-54, 895 A.2d at 959.
184. Id. ,r53, 895 A.2d at 959.
185. See id. ,i,r56-60, 895 A.2d at 959-61.
186. Id. ,r57,895 A.2d at 960.
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could potentially leave educators, administrators, and judges at a loss as to how to best
predict what programs will be deemed permissible in the future. In Maine, fortunately,
the Law Court has resolved much of the uncertainty in a manner that maintains the
strength of the Establishment Clause while avoiding a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. In other states, however, the analysis could change dramatically in the coming
years, as voucher advocates seek to repeal applicable state constitutional
amendments. 187 If those attempts are successful, the already confusing area of school
funding law could be muddled anew. To be sure, the nature of the Establishment
Clause does not make issues surrounding it simple, 188 but the Court could have made
a better effort of clearly stating its reasoning in this area.
Maine is one of a "handful of ... states ... in which Zelman reopened the debate
over the constitutionality of nonpublic school funding," 189 in large part because of
Maine's lack ofa constitutional amendment specifically prohibiting the use of public
funds for religious institutions. Nonetheless, the Law Court was correct to leave
Maine's tuition reimbursement program and its exclusion ofreligious schools intact.
Although there may be significant confusion as to where the line will fall between that
which is permissible and that which is unconstitutional, and as to what criteria will be
used to make that determination, it was important for the Law Court to articulate that
Maine's ability to exclude religious organizations from the receipt of public funds falls
on the "permissible" side of that line.
Even though the Maine Constitution does not mandate a more strict separation of
church and state than does the Federal Constitution, the Maine tuition program and the
issues it entails are more similar to the Locke case than they are to the Zelman case.
That is, even if the Supreme Court insists on determining complex constitutional
questions based on extra-constitutional factors such as the economic woes of the
Cleveland school system, the Law Court did not apply such factors in its assessment
of Maine's program, and in fact could not do so because of the manner in which the
Maine tuition program functions. Certainly, many areas of Maine may be experiencing
economic hardship, thus making it difficult to provide quality primary and secondary
education. However, this is not the basis for Maine's tuition program. Under Maine's

187. Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher Battleground: Where to Turn After Federal Challenges
to Blaine Amendments Fail, LAW& CONTEMP.PROBS.,Summer 2004, at 213, 221 ("(T]hose that hope to
establish tuition voucher programs ... suggest that the '(state constitutional amendments] are vulnerable
to challenge under the Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause ... because of their discrimination
against religious families .... "' (quoting Eric W. Treene, The Grand Finale is Just the Beginning: School
Choice and the Coming Battle over Blaine Amendments 12, The Federalist Society White Papers, available
at http://blaineamendments.org/scholarship/FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007))).
Voucher advocates also "argue[] that these state constitutional provisions fail the neutrality test set forth
by the Supreme Court .... " Id. Alternatively, voucher advocates argue that such provisions "run[] afoul
of the Free Exercise Clause because the clause protects against 'covert suppression of particular religious
beliefs."' Id. at 221-22 (quoting Briefof Amicus Curiae Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, State ex rel.
Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274 (Wash. 2002) (No. 68565-7)).
188. Justice White, for example, has described Establishment Clause jurisprudence as "sacrificing[ing]
clarity and predictability for flexibility." Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 662 (1980).
189. Lantta, supra note 187, at 241. Lantta notes that "states like Maine ... that based their denial of
funds to religious schools on interpretations of the Federal Establishment Clause are again open to
challenge." Id.
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program, families are not eligible for state education funds because they opt to send
their children to schools other than those which are offered; rather, Maine families
receive state funds precisely because there are no educational options offered at all by
the government in their communities. This removed one of the major supporting
factors in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Zelman opinion.
If the Locke Court had been governed only by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, 190 it might (although it should not) have found that allowing the use of
public funds to pursue a degree in theology did not violate the Establishment Clause,
but that denying such benefit violated the Free Exercise Clause. However, by also
examining the Washington Constitution's text pertaining to religion, the Court decided
that, while the scholarship program could have awarded Mr. Davey a scholarship
without running afoul of the Establishment Clause, it was also free to deny him the
same funding without reaching the point of violating the Free Exercise Clause. 191 This,
then, implies that Establishment Clause rights will vary from state to state. It also
leaves open the question of how the Court would approach state statutory, rather than
state constitutional, action denying funds to religious schools.
Because Maine's exclusion of sectarian schools from its tuition program is one of
these statutory, rather than constitutional, state actions, it falls into that category left
unsettled by the Supreme Court. Still, the Law Court correctly upheld the Maine
tuition reimbursement program. 192 States should be allowed to withhold funding for
religious education, not only because state constitutional provisions or statutes so
require, but because the U.S. Constitution so requires. 193 Indeed, the Law Court had
voiced agreement with this principle even before Anderson in Bagley. 194 The Supreme
Court misinterpreted and weakened the Establishment Clause in Zelman, but the Law
Court refused to extend those flaws to the novel fact pattern involved in the Maine
tuition program.
The U.S. Supreme Court has, unfortunately, eroded the strength of the
Establishment Clause over the past several decades. A majority of the Justices have
overlooked the important rationales behind the Establishment Clause: both that of
according respect to the beliefs of all U.S. citizens by not providing governmental
support to religious faiths, 195 and that of"protecting the Nation's social fabric from

190. The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST.amend. I.
191. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004) ("(T]here is no doubt that the State could, consistent
with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology .... The
question before us, however, is whether Washington ... can deny them such funding without violating the
Free Exercise Clause." (footnote and citations omitted)).
192. Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 39, 'If61,895 A.2d 944,961, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 661
(2006).
193. U.S. CONST.amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion .... "
(emphasis added)).
I 94. See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 1999 ME 60, 'If22, 728 A.2d 127, 135 ("[T]he Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from supporting or advancing religion and from forcing religion, even in
subtle ways, on those who choose not to accept it.").
195. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 43 I (I 962)(''The history of governmentally established religion,
both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with ... religion,
the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who
held contrary beliefs.").
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religious conflict. " 196 It is frighteningly rare indeed, today, for the Court to be mindful
of the fact that "[w]hen the government acts with the ostensible and predominant
purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of
official religious neutrality .... " 197
Accordingly, because Maine's exclusion of religious schools from its tuition
program is based in a statute rather than in the state constitution, the program as it is
currently formulated was seen by the Anderson plaintiffs as vulnerable to constitutional
attack. However, the Law Court confirmed that Maine's program, in actuality, does
not violate the U.S. Constitution. In light of the fact that the Supreme Court has been
so erratic with its Religion Clause cases and that it has allowed the Establishment
Clause to be eviscerated, the Law Court was wise to uphold Maine's antiestablishment
interests in not diverting public funds to religious schools.
To further protect Maine's antiestablishment interests against future attack, the
Maine legislature should also propose a state constitutional amendment clarifying the
manner in which the Establishment Clause shall be interpreted in this state. Maine is
one of a very small minority of states without an explicit constitutional provision
regarding the impermissibility of giving public funds to religious institutions. 198 If
Zelman 's weakening of the Federal Establishment Clause is allowed to stand, the
prohibition against this kind of funding in Maine is purely statutory. If it remains so,
the program's exclusion of religious schools commands less deference from other
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. However, if the exclusion were embodied
in a state constitutional amendment, it would carry more force, and proponents of the
program would more easily be able to argue similarities to Locke and Bush, both of
which involved state constitutional provisions against aid to religious institutions.
Maine should not need to amend its constitution in order to pursue appropriate
antiestablishment interests; the Federal Establishment Clause should have been up to
the task. However, the Zelman opinion was decided incorrectly and is "profoundly
at odds with the Constitution." 199 The Court overlooked important constitutional
principles in arriving at the conclusion that Ohio's voucher program was constitutional.
If the Establishment Clause no longer ensures that the government will not offend nonadherents' freedom of conscience, and that religion itself will not be invaded by
government, of what value is it? 200 Truly, as Justice Stevens asserted, "[ w ]hen ever we
remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government,
we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy. " 201

196. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)(upholding injunction ordering the removal
of the Ten Commandments from courthouses).
198. Currently, thirty-seven states have constitutional provisions that expressly prohibit government aid
to religious institutions. See Blaine Amendments.org, http:/ /www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
199. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 708 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 7 I I {"It is virtually superfluous to point out that every objective underlying the
prohibition of religious establishment is betrayed by this scheme, but something has to be said about the
enormity of the violation.").
20 I. Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Court was correct in 1947 when it "inaugurated the modem era of
establishment doctrine" 202 with the Everson case: "No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. " 203 None
of the Justices dissented from this principle in 1947, it has not been overturned, and it
remains good, albeit woefully weakened, law today. 204 The fact that today's Court sees
fit to continue to erode this important constitutional principle, without relying on other
valid theories, is truly an insult to constitutional principles. 205 The Court's education
funding analysis has erroneously expanded the concept of"play in the joints" nearly
to the point of absurdity, pushing back further and further the line of permissibility
under the Establishment Clause. Gone are the days of a vigorous interpretation of the
Establishment Clause; under Zelman, even the use of public funds to support religious
education will be considered permissible. Under Locke, it appears, states will be left
to provide limitations on such potential Establishment Clause violations. In states that
choose not to do so, the force of the Establishment Clause will be lost in the vast
expanse that now exists in the joints between it and the Free Exercise Clause.

202. Id. at 686-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
204. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court has never in so many words
repudiated this statement, let alone ... overruled Everson.").
205. Justice Souter asserted, "It is ... only by ignoring the meaning of neutrality and private choice
themselves that the majority can even pretend to rest today's decision on those [principles]." Id. at 688.
Justice Souter elaborated, "Although it has taken half a century since Everson to reach the majority's twin
standards of neutrality and free choice, the facts show that, in the majority's hands, even these criteria
cannot convincingly legitimize the Ohio scheme." Id. at 695-96.
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